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We come from afar 
The Philosophical Basis of Ibn Khaldūn’s poetics 
 
My purpose is to analyse some relevant aspects of Ibn Khaldūn’s poetics exposed in 
the sixth chapter of the Muqaddima1 (Ibn Khaldūn 1332-1406). The sixth chapter of 
the Muqaddima, devoted to the classification of sciences, provides us with a precious 
picture of the medieval Arab-Islamic culture. Within that picture we can distinguish 
the multiple directions in which poetics developed in the great map of the Arab-
Islamic system of knowledge. In this presentation I focus on Ibn Khaldūn’s views on 
poetry that have a clear philosophical basis, relying upon the Hellenistic philosophical 
tradition of Islam (falsafa). I particularly refer to the impact of Avicenna (980-1037) 
and the Neo-Platonic trends of Islamic philosophy on Ibn Khaldūn’s poetics, while I 
only refer in very general terms to the influence of rationalist Western falsafa 
(Averroes, 1126-1198). This latter topic would require development in an article of its 
own.  
I believe that Ibn Khaldūn attributes to poetry a fundamentally cognitive value, which 
was provided both by the autochthonous Arab notion of poetry as the “Archive of the 
Arabs” (dīwan al-‘Arab) and the Hellenistic philosophical notion of poetry as the 
eighth branch of logic. In the sixth chapter of the Muqaddima the traditional Arab-
Islamic ethical function of poetry becomes subordinate to its epistemological function, 
although it remains relevant, given that the major concern of Ibn Khaldūn was to 
                                                             
1 Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406), Muqaddima, ed. Khalīl Shaḥāda, Muqaddima Ibn Khaldūn (Beirut: Dār Al-Fikr, 
2001). Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima, transl. Franz Rosenthal, The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to 
History, volumes I-III (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). English translations of the 
Muqaddima are Rosenthal’s, unless otherwise noted. 
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define the subject, the criteria and the limits for each single science, in order to 
establish its degree of certainty (al-yaqīn). My analysis of Ibn Khaldūn’s poetics has 
the advantage of highlighting continuity between the religiously “orthodox” sixth 
chapter of the book and the previous “rationalist” and “empiricist” ones. Continuity in 
Ibn Khaldūn’s thought does not exclude the existence of dialectic contradictions, 
which are not incoherent but reflect the dialectic contradictions of the Arab-Islamic 
cultural system itself. Every cultural system has its own contradictions, which are the 
potential instruments for overcoming the system itself when historical circumstances 
make that possible2. 
Finally I argue that Ibn Khaldun’s Neo-Platonic philosophical approach to poetry, and 
more precisely to the nature of the process of poetical composition, can be fully 
understood only as the manifestation of what Fernand Braudel called les grands 
courants sous-jacents de l’histoire3. Ibn Khaldun’s poetics relies upon a philosophical 
reinterpretation of an archaic notion of poetry that, in immemorial pre-Islamic times, 
was associated with the sphere of the magical and the supernatural, as the Koranic 
“condemnation” of poetry indicates. In Islamic times Neo-Platonic philosophers like 
al-Fārābī (872 ca. - 950) and Avicenna described poetry as a non-demonstrative, 
imaginative cognitive proceeding. Although they never explicitly compared poetry and 
prophecy, they described them in analogous terms4.  
                                                             
2 Umberto Eco, Le problème esthétique chez Thomas d’Aquin (Paris : Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1993), pp. 5-12. Eco’s analysis of Thomas Aquinas’ aesthetics has been a source of 
inspiration for my analysis of Ibn Khaldūn’s poetics. 
3 Fernad Braudel, Ecrits sur l'histoire (Paris : Flammarion, 1985), p. 13. 
4 Al-Fārābī (d. 950), Al-Madīnat al-fāḍila, ed. Massimo Campanini,  La Città virtuosa (Milano : Rizzoli, 
1996), see chapters XIV, XV, XXVI. Avicenna (d. 1037), ‘Ilm al-nafs,  trans. Ján Bakoš, Psychologie 
d’Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne) d’après son oeuvre ash-Shifāʼ, volumes I-II (Prague: Editions de l’Académie 
Tchécoslovaque des Sciences, 1956), II, pp.119-129; Avicenna, ‘Ilm al-nafs, ed. Ján Bakoš, Al-fann 
al-sādis min al-ṭabī‘īyyāt (‘ilm al-nafs) min Kitāb al- Shifāʼ taʼlīf Ibn Sīnā, ed. Ján Bakoš, volumes I-II 
(Prague: Editions de l’Académie Tchécoslovaque des Sciences, 1956), I, pp. 163-177. Avicenna’s 
considerations on prophecy can be compared with his consideration on poetry: Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt 
wa al-tanbīhāt, ed. Suliman Dunya (Cairo: Dar al Marif, 1960), pp. 510-512. Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt wa 
al-tanbīhāt . ‘Ilm al-Manṭiq, trans. Shams Constantine Inati, Ibn Sīnā. Remarks and Admonitions. Part 
One: Logic (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1984), p. 148. Ismail M. Dahiyat, 
Avicenna’s Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle, a critical study with an annotated translation of the 
text (Leiden: Brill, 1974).  
3 
 
 
The aim of Ibn Khaldūn in his Kitāb al-‘Ibar, of which the Muqaddima is an 
introduction, is the study of history (fann al-tārīkh), of human society (al-ijtimā‘ al-
insānī) and world civilisation (‘umrān al-‘ālam), of which he intends to discover the 
internal causes (‘ilal, asbāb) and the general laws (qawānīn) ruling their development. 
In the sixth chapter of the Muqaddima, entitled “On the different categories of 
sciences”5, Ibn Khaldūn gives an encyclopaedic picture of the Arab-Islamic system of 
knowledge. Ibn Khaldūn also presents the position occupied by poetry and poetics-
related disciplines within that system of knowledge, and he expresses his own views 
on them. 
Poetry is an art that played a pervasive role in the Arab-Islamic culture of the Middle 
Ages. All pre-modern civilisations held poetry in high regard, and the “logocentric” 
Arab-Islamic civilisation did so even more. The ethic, cognitive and spiritual value 
attributed to poetry in the Islamic Middle-Ages is not comparable with the value 
attributed to poetry in contemporary societies. First, during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries poetry was progressively marginalised by prose (the novel). More 
recently, in the so-called postmodern era, in Western societies poetry seems to adopt 
a minimalist program, renouncing its previous social and spiritual ambitions6. It is not 
an easy task to define the epistemological place occupied by poetry in the 
Muqaddima.  When Ibn Khaldūn deals with poetics as a theory and a system of 
norms depending on linguistic sciences, he calls it either a discipline (fann) or a 
science (‘ilm): ilm al-adab, ‘ilm al-bayān, ‘ilm al-balāgha, etc. When he deals with 
poetry as a concrete creative practice or as the corpus of the “Classics”, he calls it a 
discipline (fann) three times, a craft or an art (ṣinā‘a) four times, but in the large 
majority of cases he calls it simply poetry (shi‘r). This fact reveals his hesitation to 
objectively define the limits of poetry itself too narrowly, those limits that the Arab 
                                                             
5 The full title is “The various kinds of sciences. The methods of instruction. The conditions that obtain 
in these connections”, in Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, trans. Rosenthal, II: 409-463; vol. III. 
ههوجو رئاس و هقرط و ميلعتلا و اهفانصأ و مولعلا يف , Muqaddima, ed. Shaḥāda, pp. 542-840. 
6 William Marx, L’Adieu à la littérature. Histoire d’une dévalorisation XVIII-XX siècle (Paris : Les 
Editions de Minuit, 2005). 
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scholarly philological tradition had imposed to it since the first centuries of the 
hegira7.   
It seems that Ibn Khaldūn worked on the sixth chapter of the Muqaddima prevalently 
in the last part of his life, during his stay in Mamlūk Cairo (1382-1406), where he 
worked as a Mālikī judge and a professor of Mālikī law, after having abandoned the 
political and diplomatic life he had lead in his younger age in North Africa. 
At first sight, the reader is impressed by the gap between the first five chapters of the 
Muqaddima and the sixth one. In the first five chapters Ibn Khaldūn deals with the 
history of the Islamic world and especially the Maghreb, with the purpose of 
understanding the internal causes and the general rules of it through an empiric, 
scientific and rational method that remains unique both in the Arab world and in 
Europe until modern times. The sixth chapter, instead, is characterised apparently by 
Ibn Khaldūn’s total adhesion to Islamic orthodoxy. He follows the line al-Ash‘arī - al-
Ghazālī, pushing further than the author of the Tahāfut al-Falāsifa his formal 
refutation of the use of logic and philosophy (Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī 874-936; Abū 
Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī 1058 ca.-1111). In the sixth chapter Ibn Khaldūn accepts Islamic 
orthodox literalism and semi-anthropomorphism in the Qur’ān’s interpretation, the 
orthodox rejection of “secondary causes”, and follows with conviction al-Ghazālī’s 
inclination to Sufism.  
The sixth chapter is structured according to the traditional Islamic classification of 
sciences. Ibn Khaldūn distinguishes between “philosophical rational sciences” (al-
‘ulūm al-ḥikmiyya al-falsafiyya)8 and “religious transmitted sciences” (al-‘ulūm al-
naqliyya al-waḍ‘iyya), the first being of non-Arab (especially Greek) and of pre-
Islamic origin, the second being of Arab and Muslim origin. On closer examination, as 
other scholars have pointed out, the real subject of the sixth chapter is not the 
classification of sciences for its own sake, but epistemology, both in the sense of a 
theory of knowledge and a philosophy of sciences9. I argue that poetry and poetics-
related disciplines are analysed by Ibn Khaldūn from the point of view of their peculiar 
cognitive process and the kind of knowledge they produce.  
                                                             
7 Jamel Eddine Bencheikh, Poétique arabe (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1989), pp. I-VII. 
8 Ibn Khaldūn also refers to them as « rational sciences » (al-‘ulūm al-‘aqliyya). 
9 Mohammed ‘Abed al-Jabri, Naḥnu wa-l-turāth (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2006), pp. 323-
399. See also Ahmad Zeid, The Epistemology of Ibn Khaldūn (London/New-York: Routledge 2003). 
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In Ibn Khaldūn’s classification of sciences, poetry and poetics-related disciplines 
have a double religious and philosophical collocation, according to a well-established 
Islamic encyclopaedic framework. On the one side poetry and poetics-related 
disciplines (ṣinā‘at al-shi‘r, ‘ilm al-adab, ‘ilm al-bayān, ‘ilm al-balāgha, etc.) are 
mentioned among linguistic sciences (ulūm al-lisān al- ‘arabī), which are auxiliary and 
propaedeutic to traditional-religious sciences (Ibn Khaldūn employs the verb hayya’a, 
to prepare, and the adjective āliyya, instrumental). On the other side, poetry (shi‘r) is 
mentioned as a branch of logic, which is an instrument of philosophical sciences 
(āliyya, Gr. organon). The philosophical collocation of poetry comes from the 
Hellenistic commentators of Aristotle. However this double collocation was not 
perceived as contradictory by the Arabs, given the common Greek and Arab ethical, 
encomiastic and cognitive value of poetry.  
What may seem contradictory in Ibn Khaldūn is the fact that he gives poetry a place 
among linguistic sciences which are auxiliary to religious sciences; however he 
describes the process of poetical composition as a cognitive process reproducing 
Avicenna’s theory of knowledge. But when he deals with religiously transmitted 
sciences he formally refutes Islamic philosophy (falsafa) in the name of Islamic 
orthodoxy: in a section of the sixth chapter entitled “Fī ibṭāl al-falsafa” (On the 
refutation of philosophy) he explains that “the intellect should not be used to weigh 
such matters as the oneness of God, the other world, the truth of prophecy, the real 
character of the divine attributes or anything else that lies beyond the level of the 
intellect”10. In other words he refutes the pretention of falsafa to study and apprehend 
God by rational means, given that God can be apprehended only through revelation. 
How can we explain this contradiction? 
First I should remind the reader that Ibn Khaldūn admits a limited use of reason also 
in the field of religiously transmitted sciences. 
 
 مولعلايعضولا ةيلقنلاة  اهيف لاجم لا و .يعرشلا عضاولا نع ربخلا ىلإ ةدنتسم اهلك يه و
 لقعلللاإ ٍهجوب ... لوصلأاب اهلئاسم نم عورفلا قاحلإ يف  .ٍسايقلاإ  سايقلا اذه نأ
ف يلقن وه و لصلأا يف مكحلا توبثب ربخلا نع عرفتيإ سايقلا اذه عجر هعرفتل لقنلا ىل
ه اهلك ةيلقنلا مولعلا هذه لصأ و .هنع كلذ عبتتسي مث ... ةنسلا و باتكلا نم تايعرشلا ي
نآرقلا ّلزن هب و ةلملا ناسل وه يذلا يبرعلا ناسللا مولع11  
                                                             
10 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, trans. Rosenthal, II: 436-437. 
11 Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima, ed. Shaḥāda, pp. 549-550. 
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All of them [traditional sciences] depend upon information based on the 
authority of the given religious law. There is no place for the intellect in 
them, save that the intellect may be used in connection with them to relate 
problems of detail with basic principles (…) by some kind of analogical 
reasoning. However, such analogical reasoning is derived from the 
(traditional) information, while the character of the basic principle, which is 
traditional, remains valid (unchanged). Thus, analogical reasoning of this 
type reverts to being tradition (itself), because it is derived from it.  
The basis of all the traditional sciences is the legal material of the Qur'ān 
and the Sunnah (…) This, further, requires as auxiliary sciences the 
sciences of the Arabic language. Arabic is the language of Islam, and the 
Qur'an was revealed in it12. 
 
Secondly, I think that the most important reason why Ibn Khaldūn describes the 
process of poetical composition in philosophical terms is due to the fact that he is 
conscious that poetry transcends the limits imposed to it by the Arab philologists and 
embraces a larger cognitive field.  
Arab-Islamic philosophy (falsafa) had a deep impact on Ibn Khaldūn’s thought. As a 
young man, Ibn Khaldūn received an education that included philosophical 
intellectual sciences. Despite the anti-rationalist orthodox reaction and the spread of 
Sufism in Ibn Khaldūn’s times, he grew up in enlightened, cultivated, upper-class 
family and circles. He formally refuted philosophy, but his views on prophecy, 
physics, cosmology and gnoseology13 are largely based on falsafa, and particularly 
on Eastern falsafa and the philosophy of Avicenna14. Western rationalist falsafa 
                                                             
12 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, trans. Rosenthal, III: 436-437. 
13  Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, trans. Rosenthal, II: 411-424. Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima, ed. 
Shaḥāda, pp. 784-794. 
14 Jamal Abdelali Elamrani, “Prophétie selon Ibn Khaldūn et philosophie arabe classique”, in Ibn 
Khaldūn et la foundation des sciences sociales, ed. Zeïneb ben Saïd and Georges Labica (Paris : 
Publisud, 2009), pp. 69-77. 
On prophecy, see Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, trans. Rosenthal, I: 194-202. 
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(Averroes) had a more indirect impact on Ibn Khaldūn’s thought. As Yves Lacoste 
pointed out, Islamic philosophical rationalism, freed from its metaphysical abstraction, 
certainly contributed to the formation of Ibn Khaldūn’s empirical-scientific approach to 
historiography15. In the field of poetics the methodological influence of Averroes on 
Ibn Khaldūn is even more subtle. From an epistemological point of view Ibn Khaldūn 
faces the problem of giving a rigorous definition of poetics as a science and of 
poetical composition as a psychological proceeding. In a section of the sixth chapter 
entitled “The craft of poetry and the way of learning it”16 he raises this problem in a 
rationalist “Averroistic” way, asking himself: “What makes a poetical work a work of 
art”?, with the same methodological rigor with which Averroes defines the respective 
objects and proceedings of philosophy and religious Law in his Faṣl al-maqāl 17. But 
the answer given by Ibn Khaldūn to such an “Averroistic” question is rather Neo-
Platonic and relies upon Avicenna’s theory of knowledge. Indeed Avicenna provided 
him with the most valuable intellectual instruments to explain the non-demonstrative 
nature of poetry. I don’t know whether the question of “poeticity” had ever been 
formulated in these terms before Ibn Khaldūn. It is with scientific rigor that Ibn 
Khaldūn describes the act of poetical “composition”(ta’līf). In modern terms I would 
say the act of “poetical creation”, but of course Ibn Khaldūn could not employ this 
term, since creation is a prerogative of God and innovation is reprehensible in Islam. 
He clearly understands that the procedure of poetical composition does not follow the 
path of philosophical demonstrative reasoning (‘aql) nor does it simply rely “upon 
information based on the authority of the given religious law” (naql). The success of 
the creative poetic act does not depend on a correct use of logic, not (only) on the 
knowledge of the scientific norms (qawānīn ‘ilmiyya) of Arab eloquence and rhetoric, 
nor on a pedantic and correct imitation of the most prominent Arab Poets. Ibn 
Khaldūn points out that this kind of knowledge is necessary but not sufficient. The 
                                                             
15 Yves Lacoste, Ibn Khaldoun. Naissance de l’histoire, passé du tiers monde (Paris: La Découverte & 
Syros, 1998). 
16 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, III: 373-390. 
17 Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), Faṣl al-maqāl, ed. Mohammed ‘Abed al-Jabri, Faṣl al-maqāl. Fī taqrīr mā 
bayna al-sharī‘a wa al- ḥikma min al-ittiṣāl (Beirut: Markaz dirāsāt al-waḥda al-‘arabiyya, 1997). 
Averroes, Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl, trans. George F. Hourani, On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy 
(London: Messr. Luzac and Co., 1976).  
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distinguishing character of a poetical work, he says, is its “conformity with the models 
of the Arabs” (‘alā asālīb al-‘Arab). 
 
 يف ةقفتم ءازجأب لضفملا ،فاصولأا و ةراعتسلاا ىلع ينبملا غيلبلا ملاكلا وه رعشلا
 ىلع يراجلا هدعب و هلبق امع هدصقم و هضرغ يف اهنم ءزج لك لقتسم يورلا و نزولا
. هب ةصوصخملا برعلا بيلاسأ..  امع هل لصف هب ةصوصخملا بيلاسلأا ىلع يراجلا انلوق
 موظنم ملاك وه امنإ ارعش نوكي لا ذئنيح هنإف ةفورعملا برعلا بيلاسأ ىلع هنم رجي مل18  
 
“Poetry is eloquent speech built upon metaphoric usage and descriptions; 
divided into cola agreeing in meter and rhyme letter, each colon being 
independent in purpose and meaning from what comes before and after it; 
and using the methods of the Arabs peculiar to it… The phrase ‘using the 
methods . . . peculiar to it’ differentiates (poetry) from (speech) that does 
not use the well-known methods of poetry. Without them, it would not be 
poetry but merely poetical speech”.19 
 
The “models of the Arabs” are the “asālīb al-‘Arab”. Asālīb, plural of uslūb literally 
means pattern. This term has been used in Arab literary criticism before Ibn Khaldûn 
by Ibn Qutayba (828-889) and Ḥāzim al-Qarṭājannī (1211-1285) 20 , but to my 
knowledge Ibn Khaldûn gives an unprecedented philosophical sense to it. He 
explains what the asālīb are and how they function. Ibn Khaldûn says that the asālīb 
are “the” elements that make a speech a poetical work. There are “models” not only 
for poetry but for all literary genres and linguistic disciplines: poetry, prose, grammar, 
syntax, stylistics, eloquence, prosody. The Qur’ān itself has its own peculiar and 
incomparable “models”. Only poetical “models” are explained in detail.  
Ibn Khaldûn describes the “asālīb al-‘Arab” as a universal mental form (ṣūra dhihniya) 
which the mind abstracts (yantazi‘uhā al-dhihn) from the most prominent word 
combinations (a‘yiān al-tarākīb) 21 . Then the mind transfers that form to the 
                                                             
18 Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima, ed. Shaḥāda, 2001, p. 789. 
19Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, trans. Rosenthal, III: 381-382.  
20 See G.J.H. Van Gelder, Beyond the Line. Classical Arabic Literary Critics on the Coherence and 
Unity of the Poem (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982). 
21 I think that according to the philosophical interpretation that I propose for Ibn Khaldūn’s asālīb 
theory, it is also possible to understand the term a‘yān as Avicenna’s “essence”, according to the 
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imagination (khayāl), as if that form was a mould (qālib) or a loom (minwāl). Then 
they return to the mind. It is in the soul (al-nafs) that these forms become “firmly 
rooted” (tarsakhu). A “universal absolute mould” (qālib kullī muṭlaq) is abstracted from 
particular moulds and the poet draws from it what is necessary for his poetical 
composition (ta’līf). At the end of this circle, the universal absolute mould leaves the 
soul and descends to verbal experience as processed poetical verbal material, ready 
to be used in its turn for new cycles of poetical composition (ta’alîf). Ibn Khaldūn 
describes the act of poetical composition (ta’līf) as a cognitive act, using the 
conceptual and linguistic apparatus provided by Avicenna’s Psychology (‘Ilm al-Nafs), 
the 6th book of the Kitāb al-Shifā’.  Ibn Khaldūn’s proceeding of poetical composition 
is analogous to Avicenna’s cognitive proceeding, save that in Ibn Khaldūn’s text 
verbal combinations (tarākīb) replace Avicenna’s sensual things (al-maḥsūsāt). In 
some cases the two authors employ an analogous vocabulary. Ibn Khaldūn says that 
the mind (al-dhihn) abstracts the poetical ‘models’, which are forms, from the 
particular word combinations. Avicenna, in his description on how the human soul 
uses senses, also says that the mind (al-dhihn) abstracts the forms of the universals 
from particular things.  
 
: [ نودلخ نبا] 
لايخلا يف اهُرّيصي و اهصاخشأ و بيكارتلا نايعأ نم نهذلا اهعزتني ةروصلا كلت و22  
  
[Ibn Khaldūn]: “This form [the poetical model] is abstracted by the mind 
from the most prominent individual word combinations and given a place in 
the imagination” 23 
 
: [ انيس نبا] 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
explanation given to it by Anne-Marie Goichon, Lexique de la langue philosophique d’Ibn Sina (Paris: 
Desclée de Brower, 1938): “C’est un des mots désignant l’essence, mais avec la nuance particulière 
de l’essence existant concrètement, dans un individu donné … », p. 257. 
22 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, trans. Rosenthal, III: 376. 
23 Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima, ed. Shaḥāda, 2001, p. 786. 
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 تايلكلا نهذلا عازتنا اهدحا ةعبرا روما تايئزجلا نم اهل لصحتف ... ةقطانلا سفنلا
 ةداملا نع اهيناعمل ديرجت ليبس ىلع تايئزجلا نم ةدرفملا24  
 
[Avicenna] : “Car, des choses particulières, viennent à l’esprit pour l’âme 
quatre choses, dont l’une est l’abstraction, (effectuée) par l’esprit, des 
universels incomplexes (tires) des choses particulières en abstrayant leurs 
idées de la matière” 25 
 
Ibn Khaldūn’s asālīb remind me of Avicenna’s forms of the intelligibles, just like the 
ascendant hierarchy of ‘moulds’ (‘particular moulds’, ‘universal mould’ and the 
‘universal absolute mould’) presents a certain analogy with the hierarchical pattern of 
Avicenna’s gnoseology.    
Imagination plays a fundamental role both in Ibn Khaldūn’s asālīb theory and in 
Avicenna’s theory of knowledge. In both cases the imaginative speech is associated 
with a non-demonstrative, intuitive act of knowledge. In Ibn Khaldūn’s theory it is 
imagination (khayāl) that works the verbal material in order to obtain poetical models, 
which then become well-rooted in the soul. Although in Ibn Khaldūn’s discourse the 
mind (dhihn)26 plays a role at the beginning of the conception of poetical models, 
there is a crucial moment in which imagination seems to be in direct contact with the 
soul (nafs), without intermediary faculties.  
According to Avicenna’s psychology man cannot usually rely upon imagination alone 
in order to attain knowledge, because imagination is distracted by senses. But there 
are exceptional people whose soul establishes direct contact with imagination, 
because their imaginative faculty is very powerful.  It can happen in sleep, and this is 
                                                             
24 Avicenna, Psychologie, trans. Bakoš, 1956, I: 218. 
25 Avicenna, Psychologie, ed. Bakoš, 1956, II : 157. 
26 According to Anne-Marie Goichon dhihn means “Esprit en général, sens plus large que ‘aql, 
intelligence, et correspondant parfaitement à la mens des Latins … ‘l’esprit est une faculté de l’āme 
préparant à acquérir la science’ [Ibn Sīnā,  Al-Najāt (Le Caire : Le Salut, 1331/1913, p. 137)], … 
Cependant si on creuse le sens de dhihn, il apparait comme intermédiaire entre l’intelligence 
proprement dite et l’imagination, sens voisin de celui de l’estimative, mais un peu plus intellectuel, qui 
correspond alors à la cogitative des Latins », Anne-Marie Goichon, Lexique de la langue 
philosophique d’Ibn Sina, 1938, pp. 132-134. 
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the case of truthful dreams, or in wakefulness, and this is the case of a peculiar kind 
of prophecy. 
 
 ظافلاب حبشلا كلذ نم باطخ مهنوكردي ام امنا نوليختي و حبش مهل لثمتي ام اًريثك و
ةليختملا ةوقلاب ةصاخلا ةوبنلا يه هذه و ىلتت و هظفحت ةعومسم27  
 
”Souvent une image se représente à eux, et ils se figurent que ce qu’ils 
perçoivent n’est qu’une allocution de cette image due à des paroles 
entendues qui l’ont conservée et qui sont relatées. Et ceci est la prophétie 
particulière par la faculté imaginative”28. 
 
Avicenna describes the cognitive proceeding of this peculiar kind of prophecy, relying 
upon the imaginative faculty, in an analogous way in which he describes the 
cognitive proceeding of poetry. 
 
 .ةبذاك وأ ةقداص تناك اهلييخت ربتعي ثيح نم ،ةليخملا تامدقملا نم ةفلؤم ةيرعشلا 
 ،ةاكاحملا نم اهيف امب سفنلا اهلبقتست فيلأت و ةئيه اهل ثيح نم تامدقملا نم ةلمجلاب و
.قدصلا نم و لب 
.نزولا هجوري و كلذ نم عنام لاف 29  
 
“Poetical syllogisms are composed of imagined propositions, inasmuch as 
their imagined aspect is considered, be they true or false. In short, they 
are composed of premises, inasmuch as these premises have a certain 
disposition or composition, which the soul receives by virtue of their 
                                                             
27 Avicenna, Psychologie, trans. Bakoš, 1956, I:168. 
28 Avicenna, Psychologie, trans. Bakoš, 1956, II: 122. TheMuqaddima’s «Sixth Prefatory Discussion. 
The various types of human beings who have supernatural perception either through natural 
disposition or through exercise, preceded by a discussion of inspiration and dream visions», Ibn 
Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, trans. Rosenthal, I: 184-245 is clearly inspired by Avicenna’s « Quatrième 
chapitre, deuxième section: Des actes de la faculté formatrice et cogitatives parmi ces sens internes. 
Cette section renferme un discours sur le sommeil, la veille, le songe vrai et trompeur et une sorte de 
propriété de la prophétie », Avicenna, Psychologie, trans. Bakoš, 1956, II: 119-129. 
28 Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima, ed. Shaḥāda, 2001, p. 786. 
29 Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, ed. Suliman Dunya (1960), pp. 510-512. Variations in the Arabic 
text have been omitted. 
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resemblance or by virtue of their truth. [That is as long as] there is nothing 
to prevent this [reception]. And meter enhances this [reception]”.30 
 
Also in his commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics Avicenna refers to the fact that poetry is 
“imaginative speech” (kalām mukhayyil), that is to say “the speech to which the soul 
yields, accepting or rejecting matters without pondering, reasoning or choice. In brief, 
it responds psychologically rather than in a ratiocinative manner. It produces in man 
the feelings of pleasure (ladhdha) and astonishment (ta‘ajjub) 31. Both in the case of 
prophecy and poetry an imaginative cognitive proceeding expresses itself through a 
figurative language. I argue that Avicenna’s theory of prophecy (as a part of his 
Psychology) and poetic syllogism are indispensable to understand Ibn Khaldūn’s 
theory of poetical composition. Of course other elements contribute to the shaping 
Ibn Khaldūn’s views on poetry. As I mentioned before, in the sixth chapter of the 
Muqaddima Ibn Khaldūn provides us with an overall picture of the medieval Arab-
Islamic culture. In that picture we can distinguish the multiple directions in which 
poetics developed, one of them being the philosophical one, on which my analysis is 
focused. But I cannot omit to mention that Ibn Khaldūn’s neo-Platonic philosophical 
views on poetry are inseparable from his empirical Hellenistic views on poetry as a 
technique (ṣinā ‘at) and as a linguistic habit (malaka), that is to say an internalised 
knowledge of the poetical language which results from a constant practice and 
eventually becomes a second nature for the speaker. For it is at once empirical-
inductive and intuitive-deductive, the linguistic notion of malaka32 is the crucial axis of 
the tension between immanency and transcendence which characterises Ibn 
Khaldūn’s poetics. 
 
In my conclusion I would like to further clarify the deeper meaning of the 
philosophical basis of Ibn Khaldūn poetics. Within the framework of my interpretation 
                                                             
30 Avicenna, Al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt . ‘Ilm al-Manṭiq, trans. Shams Constantine Inati (1984), p. 148.  
31 Ismail M. Dahiyat, Avicenna’s Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle, a critical study with an 
annotated translation of the text (Leiden: Brill, 1974), pp. 61-62. 
32 Probably the Arab-Islamic reinterpretation of the Aristotelian ēxis (habit). See Ibn Khaldūn, 
Muqaddima, transl. Vincent Monteil, Ibn Khaldoun. Discours sur l’histoire universelle (Paris: Thesaurus 
Sindbad : 1967-1968), p. XXXI. 
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of the sixth chapter of the Muqaddima as the exposition of Ibn Khaldūn’s theory of 
knowledge, I have argued that Ibn Khaldūn attributes an essential cognitive value to 
poetry, which is the result of the combination of two elements.  
The first element (not necessarily in order of importance) is the ancient Arab notion of 
Diwān al-Arab and its development by the subsequent Arab-Islamic philological 
tradition, which continued to hold poetry in high regard but deprived poets of their 
authority on it, to the advantage of scholars philologists. The Qur’ān’s primitive 
“condemnation” of poetry was the reversed expression of the extraordinary status 
that poetry enjoyed in archaic times. Then historical Islam came, and it rehabilitated 
poetry but under the condition that it lost its supernatural status, a status that had to 
be monopolised by God alone. However, it is not by chance that in the Arab-Islamic 
philosophical tradition, poetry inherited from its archaic status certain distinguishing 
features such as the fact of relying upon imagination and not upon reason, or of 
making systematic use of figurative speech and not of demonstrative reasoning. 
The second element is the Greek philosophical tradition, which, from Aristotle 
onward, deprived poetry of its ancient supernatural value and turned it into “normal” 
literature.  Aristotle in his Poetics rehabilitated poetry from Plato’s condemnation, 
saying that poetry is “more philosophical” than history, because history speaks about 
the “particular” while poetry speaks about the “universal” 33 . Subsequent 
developments went further in the direction of neutralising poetry from its archaic 
supernatural status: Hellenistic commentators of Aristotle considered poetics as the 
eighth and last branch of logic; late Antiquity and a great part of the European Middle 
Ages considered the art of poetry simply as a branch of grammar34. 
Both the Arabs and the Greeks intended to neutralise the archaic supernatural value 
of poetry, attributing to it a positive but limited and worldly cognitive value. However, 
in the longue durée of history there are things that are slow in disappearing. Ibn 
                                                             
33 Aristotle (d. 322 B.D.), Perí Poiētikēs, trans. Diego Lanza, Aristotele. Poetica (Milano, Biblioteca 
Universale Rizzoli, 1990), pp.146-147.On Aristotle’s rehabilitation of poetry see Diego Lanza, 
Aristotele. Poetica (1990), pp. 74-83. On the Arab-Islamic rehabilitation of poetry, see Giovanna Lelli, 
“Pour une méthodologie du comparatisme”, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung. Vol 62, 2 
(2009), pp. 231-240. 
34 Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (London : Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1979), chapter VIII. 
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Khaldūn found it difficult to decide whether poetry is a discipline, a craft, an art or a 
science. He prefers to call it simply “poetry”. Ibn Khaldūn understood that it was 
difficult to close poetry within the boundaries of the sciences’ classifications. The 
profound reason for that is that in archaic times poetry was associated with the 
sphere of the magical and the supernatural. This is a historical reality, not a personal 
find of Ibn Khaldūn. The great merit of the Muqaddima, which remains a “Classic” not 
only for the Arabs, is that it provides the modern reader with an overall view of the 
Arab-Islamic medieval culture, including the multiple directions in which its poetics 
developed. Doing so, it also indicates to us the long and deep survival of that archaic 
value of poetry, although philosophically reinterpreted by the Islamic Middle Ages. 
 
